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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
MARY DOE, Guardian ad Litem 
for JANE DOE, 
Plaintift/Appellant, 
? s 
ROBERTO V, ARGUELLES, et al. , : 
D e f e n d n 11 f s / V ft M M ( »n e i • s , 
The appellant, Mary roc- ' T ~nd through her counsel George . 
r- « " . ^ * -^  } x v & S t o ; o b a rc-i» - a n d C a r m a n •/•.-•. a n d H e i n z 
;
 er , ' ^  ap^1 f :: ;,.:. . I: C , hereby submits, pur si lant 
-
 :]t- ,r* - : < ^ - • r>, Hir j ^ c i Amelia!".' P r o c e d u r e , t!~n 
! °r 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
i Whethe- *-**-• t , ? r! ; i % perl y addressed issues not .'• 
presented' to the ... . m.r* or 1 >riefed on appeal. 
2 'Whether t h i - Coo: t o v e r l o o k e d * !ie * .-ar-reachirK and 
func t i o n e x c e p t i o n ot tno wnvernr^enCH' • rM!;i: o-
 ; h ; 
S T A T E M E N T i ,• Tlih -!ASE 
:- r.itc. : ' • l^-^ ; r r ,. .
 ? |: e r e n c e 11 ;L e g t a t e m e I; 11 
of the I'a-.e ^ontainec. in t he ooci t i oners Brief. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The appellant hereby Incorporates bv reference the Statement 
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of Facts contained in the appellant's Brief [See pp. 2-19 of 
Appellant's Brief]. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The issues decided by this Court in its opinion filed 
December 27, 1985, were properly before the Court and 
appropriately decided. 
This case is simply one where the petitioners do not like 
the decision ot the Court and are using the provisions of Rule 35 
to attempt to get the Court to change its mind. All of the 
arguments contained in the Petition for Rehearing were before the 
Court prior to its filing of the December 27, 1985, opinion. The 
petitioners fail to show how any ot the issues raised were as a 
result of this Court misconstruing or overlooking some material 
fact, statute or decision which materially affected the results. 
Therefore, this Court should deny the Petition for Rehearing; 
and the opinion, as drafted, should stand. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THIS COURT PROPERLY CONSIDERED THE ISSUE OF 
STROMBERGfS NEGLIGENT IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 
DISCRETIONARY FUNCTION. 
The petitioners allege, "Even a cursory review of the Trial 
Court record evidences the fact that plaintiff's theory of 
liability did not include negligent implementation of the release 
decision," and, as a result, the Court improperly issued its 
ruling. Taking a cursory review of the record in this case, one 
- 2 -
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finds that said issue was properly before the District Court, as 
well as on appeal. 
Paragraphs 3 and 4 of the First Claim for Relief of plaintiff's 
Complaint states: 
Ronald Stromberg and Ralph Garn were directors of the 
Utah State Youth Development Center at all times 
relevant hereto, and Russ Van Fleet and Jeff McBride 
were the treatment plan and release coordinators for 
the Utah State Youth Development Center at all times 
relevant hereto, were responsible for the management, 
supervision, and control over Arguelles' confinement, 
treatment and released LEmphasis added] [Record on 
Appeal, p. 4J 
4'. Said individuals were negligent in their conduct 
as superintendents and treatment plan and release 
coordinators respectively, as said conduct relates to 
the confinement, treatment and decision to release 
and/or parole Roberto V. Arguelles from the Youth 
Development Center. [Record on Appeal, p. 4J 
This Court held, in Blackham v. Snelgrove, 280 P.2d 453 
(Utah, 195i) , that a complaint is required only to "... give the 
opposing party fair notice of the nature and basis or grounds of 
the claim and a general indication of the type of litigation 
involved." 
The appellant would urge the Court to review pages 12, 13 
and 14 ot the appellant's Memorandum submitted in the District 
Court, found at pages 312, 313 and 314 of the record on appeal. 
A review of that argument clearly sets forth that the appellant 
argued before the Trial Court that the defendants/petitioners 
should be held liable for failing to follow their own release 
requirements. At page 12 [Record on Appeal, p. 312], the 
appellant's Memorandum states: 
- 3 -
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Therefore, it was a requirement for his release that he 
attend counseling sessions with a professional 
counselorc This never occurred. [Record on Appeal, 
p. 31ZJ 
U.C.A. ^64-6-8 gave to defendant Stromberg the full 
power to retake the defendant [ArguellesJ into custody 
when he found out that Gilmore was treating the 
defendant. Prior to the date that Arguelles was 
actually released, the defendant Stromberg was aware 
that Gilmore was the therapist whom defendant Arguelles 
would be seeing and he changed the language of the 
release agreement as stated above. However, no action 
was taken to insure that the defendant Arguelles would 
see a "professional therapist" after his release. 
There is no evidence to support the fact that Stromberg 
had determined that the defendant Arguelles was well 
established in such a therapeutic relationship with a 
mature female therapist prior to his release, [Record 
on Appeal, p. 313J 
It is clear that if the facts as stated in the 
respective Statements ot Fact are taken in the light 
most favorable to the non-moving party, or the 
plaintiff, that said facts could support a 
determination that the defendants failed to follow the 
criteria, rules, regulations and order for placement of 
the defendant Roberto Arguelles outside of the YDC, and 
therefore, the defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment 
should be denied. [Record on Appeal, p. 318.1 
At page 32 of appellant's Trial Court Memorandum, after quoting 
§64-6-1.1, the appellant states: 
The above-quoted language placed on the YDC and the 
superintendent the duty to see that the "student" is 
meeting the conditions of his placement; that is, to 
see that the defendant Arguelles was receiving the 
adequate treatment as required by his placement 
agreement and as recommended by both Taylor, Judge 
Garff and Janet Warburton. By the defendant's own 
admission, they became aware through the officer of the 
supervisor, as referred to in §64-6-1.1(5), that the 
requirement of the release were not being met and that 
the terms ot the treatment were not being carried out. 
This placed on the superintendent the duty to see that 
either the treatment was carried out as per the release 
agreement or that the defendant Arguelles was returned 
to the YDC. He did neither. The YDC, through their 
- 4 -
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
agents, allowed the defendant Arguelles to continue in 
his non-conforming conduct; the defendant Arguelles, 
therefore, did not receive the treatment that was 
necessary and required by the release agreement; and at 
no time was the defendant seeing a "professional 
counselor" as required by the release agreement. The 
failure of the YDC through either the superintendent 
Stromberg or his agent, the parole officer, Craig 
Berthold, to act to require the defendant either to 
obtain "professional counseling" as contemplated by 
Judge Garff, Dr. Taylor and Janet Warburton, or to see 
that he was returned to custody was not a discretionary 
function, it was clearly an operational function. 
[Record on Appeal, p. 332-333J 
Finally, the Conclusion of the Memorandum states: 
At trial, the plaintiff will prove that the attack by 
the defendant Arguelles on the plaintiff1s ward was 
caused directly and proximately by the failure by the 
State of Utah, the YDC, and the State defendants to 
comply with the Judgefs order and with their own 
release requirements, and by their failure to see that 
defendant Arguelles engaged in meaningful therapy. 
LRecord on Appeal, p. 336J 
In the State's Petition for Rehearing, the Attorney General 
makes the assertion that the first time that the negligent 
implementation of a discretionary function issue was raised was 
in Point III of the appellant's Reply Brief. However, a review 
of the original Brief filed by appellant will show that this 
issue is addressed in pages 16, 17, 18, 29, 30, 31 and 38. In 
fact, at page 18 of the Brief of the respondent, the Attorney 
General complains that, "Contrary to the implications in 
appellant's Brief, there are not issues raised concerning the 
amount ot supervision by the parole officer following the 
release, the parole officer's role in implementing the parole 
plan, or the failure to retake Arguelles into custody." 
- 5 -
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Appellant sees the Attorney General's confusion being caused 
by two problems: (1) semantics; and (2) the evolution of 
language used by this Court in defining the "discretionary 
function exception". At the time of the Motion for Summary 
Judgment before Judge Fishier, and at the tirae of the drafting of 
appellant's Brief, this Court had not yet issued the decision of 
Little v. Division of Family Services, 667 P.2d 49 (Utah, 1983). 
In Little, this Court greatly clarified the law in the state of 
Utah concerning the discretionary function exception. At the 
Trial Court and Brief on Appeal, petitioner was basically relying 
upon the cases of Frank v. State, 613 P*2d 517, and Bigelow 
v. Ingersoll, 618 P.2d 50 (Utah, 1980). Both of those cases 
basically defined a discretionary function as involving broad, 
policy-making decisions. The appellant argued that the decision 
to release Arguelles, the actual release of Arguelles, the 
treatment of Arguelles by Annette Gilmore, and the failure of 
i 
Stromberg to take action when he knew Arguelles was not complying 
with the release agreement were all done on a case-by-case basis 
and did not involve broad, policy-making factors; and, therefore, 
they were "operational" and not "discretionary functions". 
Although the appellant did not use the words "implementation of a 
discretionary function11, the underlying theory was argued. 
That issue was clearly before Judge Fishier in the District 
Court and argued in the original Brief of the appellant. After 
the appellant filed her Brief, this Court issued the Little 
- 6 -
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v. Division of Family Services, supra, decision. After that 
decision came down and after the accusations made against the 
appellant by the State in their Brief, the appellant's position 
was clarified in Point III of the Reply Brief. 
It is clear that the issue of defendant Stromberg and the 
Statefs failure to see that the release criteria were complied 
with was before the Trial Court and appropriately considered by 
this Court on appeal, and that the petitioner has failed to state 
with particularity any point of law or fact which this Court 
overlooked or misapprehended in arriving at its opinion filed 
herein. 
POINT II 
THE COURT'S OPINION IN DOE V. ARGUELLES IS A 
REITERATION OF THE LAW IN THE STATE OF UTAH 
CONCERNING THE DISCRETIONARY FUNCTION 
EXCEPTION WHICH HAS BEEN IN EXISTENCE SINCE 
1980. 
The petitioner attempts to argue that the Court's opinion in 
Arguelles eliminates the discretionary function exception to the 
Governmental Immunity Act. This is plainly incorrect. The 
holding in the Arguelles opinion is the same legal principle in 
regard to the discretionary function that this state has had 
since the Frank v. State, supra, opinion, decided in 1980; i.e., 
that decisions by State officials concerning broad policy factors 
are discretionary and, therefore, protected; those actions 
implementing the decisions on a case-by-case basis are not. This 
is the Court's holding in Arguelles; i.e., that the decision to 
- 7 -
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release Arguelles is protected, but once the State official 
creates criteria by which a discretionary function is to be 
implemented, they are bound to follow those criteria. This is a 
correct balance of protecting civil servants in decision making, 
but holding them responsible to carry out decisions already madec 
The flaw in the State's argument is that it presumes that 
the State official can be held liable for implementing any policy 
decision. This misstates the Court's holding. A State official 
is only liable for negligently implementing a policy decision«, 
There is simply no reason to protect a State official who 
negligently fails to carry out an established decision at the 
expense of a grievously injured citizen. 
The State argues that all a plaintiff need do is plead 
negligent implementation to thwart the application of the 
Governmental Immunity Act. This frenetic response to the 
Court's decision ignores the fact that in order for a defendant 
to avoid this statute, the plaintiff must not only plead, but 
must prove, by a preponderance of evidence, that the State 
official negligently implemented policy. If the facts of a 
particular case will not support a claim for negligent 
implementation, then the State would be entitled to a Motion for 
Summary Judgment under Rule 56. An attorney representing a 
plaintiff who makes an allegation in a complaint that has no 
factual basis simply to avoid summary judgment would be in 
violation of Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and 
. - 8 -
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the State would have the sanctions, under Rule 11, to deal with 
that problem. Further, the State would have the protection of 
U.C.A. $78-27-56 for litigation initiated in bad faith. 
In reality, the State's objection to this Court's opinion is 
that this Court, as other Courts all over the country, is 
increasingly requiring State officials to answer for their 
wrongful conduct. As this Court stated in Standiford v. Salt 
Lake City Corp., 605 P.2d 1230 (Utah, 1980): 
Finally, and not the least of our concerns, the 
standard we adopt today to narrow governmental immunity 
should allow more innocent victims injured by tortious 
conduct on the part of public entities access to the 
courts for redress. Fewer such people will be 
mercilessly and senselessly barred from recovery for 
their injuries sustained at the hands of the entities 
designed to serve them. 
The State defendants' denunciation of this Court's unanimous 
decision is a reflection of the State's archaic position that 
State employees should not have to answer for their misconduct. 
This is simply not the law and has not been the law in the state 
of Utah since the adoption of the Governmental Immunity Act in 
1965, and is contrary to Article I, Section 11 of the 
Constitution of Utah. 
The defendants make the accusation that, "When courts take 
it upon themselves to raise, argue and decide legal questions not 
addressed by the parties, they risk overlooking important facts, 
le^al considerations and practical consequences which may result 
from a decision rendered without benefit of a complete record and 
thorough briefing." However, all the concerns raised by the 
- 9 -
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State in its Petition were argued in the District Court and 
raised in the Briefs. The parties stipulated to waive oral 
argument. They cannot now complain that they had no opportunity 
to argue the matter. The fact that the Attorney General does not 
like an opinion is not grounds for having the matter reheard. As 
this Court held in Beaver County v. Home Indemnity Co.5 52 P.2d 
435 (Utah5 1935): 
We cannot grant a rehearing for the purpose of dropping 
out ot the opinion parts unsatisfactory to counsel and 
leaving in other parts evidently satisfactory to 
counsel. It the opinion is to be modified, it should 
be modified because it fails correctly to state the 
law, or for some other reason which makes its language 
or statements improper or inapplicable. 
The State argues that Stromberg had no authority over the 
defendant and that he had to rely upon others; iee0, parole 
staff, to report violations in a quarterly report. Further, the 
report due from Arguelles' probation officer was not received 
prior to the incident that gave rise to this lawsuit. However, 
this position flies in the face of the law of the state of Utah 
in force at the time of the incident. Section 64-6-8 gave to 
defendant Stromberg full power to retake the defendant into 
custody when he found out that the criteria for release were not 
going to be met or, in the alternative, not to release Arguelles 
until he could be assured that the release criteria were met. 
Further, the parole officer who would be submitting the report 
would be an officer of the supervisor referred to in U.C.A. *>64-
6-1.1(5). 
» 10 -
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U.C.A. $64-6-8 gives defendant Stromberg the power to make 
rules and regulations. If Stromberg had to rely upon others to 
get the information in order to make the decisions he was 
obligated to make under the statute, then he had the duty to 
promulgate such regulations and rules to ensure that he had 
sufficient data to make the decision. The appellant would submit 
that requiring a quarterly report on so dangerous an individual 
as Arguelles is patently absurd. 
Stromberg knew that Arguelles was not following the release 
plan before he left the YDC. The release plan said "professional 
counselor", and he was lined up to see Annette Gilraore, a 
graduate student. Dr. Taylor testified in his deposition that he 
was concerned that Gilmore was not a professional. [See Record 
on Appeal, pp. 218, 219, 272J As a result of this concern, 
Annette Gilmore's name, which originally appeared on the release 
agreement, was stricken and "professional counselor" was 
inserted. 
Stromberg had the power, pursuant to U.C.A. $64-6-8, to take 
Arguelles oft the street if he was not complying with the order, 
or not to release him at all if appropriate therapeutic services 
had not been established. It is simply no excuse to say that he 
relied upon others to get his information. He was the head of 
the YDC; and under the doctrine of respondeat superior, the 
negligence ot his inferiors is imputable to him. 
Even assuming the defendants1 argument is correct inasmuch 
- 11 -
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as the supervision of defendant's therapy is outside Strombergfs 
control, he still had the obligation to see that the terms of the 
release agreement were in place before the release occurred. He 
knew that Annette Gilmore was not a professional therapist, as 
required by the release agreement. He knew that they were not 
meeting weekly, and that Arguelles had not responded 
satisfactorily to treatment before he was released. Arguelles 
had met only once with Gilmore before releasee This is a clear 
violation of the release criteria. I.See Record on Appeal, 
p. 264, 355, 218, 21yJ 
The petitioner has failed to show that this Court overlooked 
or misapplied some point of law or fact in its opinion; and the 
Petition should, therefore, be denied. It has been over six 
years since the plaintifffs ward, Jane Doe, had her throat slit 
by Roberto Arguelles. This Court should not delay any further in 
remanding this case for trial so that she can finally prosecute 
her civil cause without any further unnecessary delay• 
POINT III 
THE DEFENDANTS' PETITION FAILS TO STATE ANY 
REASON AT ALL WHY THE COURT SHOULD REHEAR THE 
ISSUE OF QUASI-JUDICIAL IMMUNITY. 
The defendants* Petition fails to state any reason at all 
why the Court should rehear the issue of quasi-judicial immunity, 
and the defendant should be entitled to pursue her claim of gross 
negligence against defendant Stromberg. Therefore, under no 
circumstances should the Court rehear those issues. 
- 12 -
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CONCLUSION 
It is clear that the defendants pled in their Complaint that 
State defendant Stromberg and the State of Utah were responsible 
for the management, supervision, and control over Arguelles1 
confinement, treatment and release; that said individuals were 
negligent in their conduct as it relates to the confinement, 
treatment and decision to release and/or parole Arguelles from 
the YDC; that the issue was argued, briefed and preserved at the 
Trial Court, was raised on appeal by the Briefs of the parties, 
and was appropriately considered by this Court; and that the 
petitioners failed to demonstrate in any way, pursuant to Rule 35 
of the Appellate Rules, that this Court overlooked or 
misapprehended any point of law or fact. Therefore, the Petition 
for Rehearing should be denied. 
DATED this /Q day of February, 1986. 
HALEY & STOLEBARGER 
GEORGE M^NtfAl 
A t t o r n e y f o r P l ^ a ^ h t i f f f A p p e l l a n t 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
HAND-DELIVERED AND/OR MAILED, postage prepaid, this i-T^ 
day of February, 1986, four true and correct copies of the 
foregoing Appellant's Response to Defendants' Petition for 
Rehearing, to: 
Carlie Christensen 
Assistant Attorney General 
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
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